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The Irrefutable Logic of Judgment
Proofing: A Reply to Professor Schwarcz
Lynn M. LoPucki*

In The Inherent Irrationality of Judgment Proofing,I Professor Steven L

Schwarcz raises interesting new arguments against my death of liability the
sis. The sheer number of those arguments makes it impossible for me to respond to all of them. The core of Schwarcz's insight is to divide judgment
proofing structures into those negotiated at arm's length and those constructed within a single corporate group. I consider his arguments regarding
the first set of structures in Part I and the second set in Part I1.2
I. ARM'S LENGTH TRANSACTION JUDGMENT PROOFING

To demonstrate the judgment proofing potential of asset securitization, in
The Death of Liability I used the example of a hypothetical Exxon Corporation that sold all of its assets through a series of such transactions.3 The sales
were to "bankruptcy-remote" trusts or corporations that the arm's length purchasers established specifically for the purpose of the asset-securitization
transactions. As part of those transactions, Exxon leased the assets back
from the buyers and agreed to use them in substantially the same manner as
before. From the proceeds of sale, Exxon first paid its creditors and then
distributed the remainder to its shareholders as dividends. At the conclusion
of these transactions, Exxon operated substantially the same business as before, but had neither assets nor liabilities. Exxon was judgment proof.

Schwarcz makes three principal arguments in response to this example.
First, he argues that the asset securitization did not judgment proof Exxon,
* Lynn M. LoPucki is the Security Pacific Bank Professor of Law at the UCLA Law School.
Professor LoPucki thanks Frances Foster, Ken Klee, Jesse Fried, and Elizabeth Warren for com-

ments on earlier drafts.

1. Steven L. Schwarcz, The Inherent Irrationality of Judgment Proofing, 52 STAN. L. REv. 1

(1999).

2. I do not address Professor Mooney's essay, Judgment Proofing, Bankruptcy Policy, and the
Dark Side of Tort Liability, 52 STAN. L. REv. 73 (1999). The Stanford Law Review solicited pieces
from Mooney and myself as replies to Professor Schwarcz's article. However, only the first paragraph of what Mooney has written actually responds to Schwarcz. That paragraph states Mooney's
opinion of Schwarcz's article (he considers it persuasive) without reason or support, and then

moves on to a new topic.

3. See Lynn M. LoPucki, The Death of Liability, 106 YALE L.J. 1, 25-26 (1996).
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the payment of the dividend did. Second,
hurt by arm's length transactions such as these because the debtor receives

equivalent value in return for the assets sold. Third, Schwarcz argues that
asset-owning entities ("F2" in his examples) will find that the costs of participation in arm's length judgment proofing exceed the benefits. I respond
to each of these arguments separately.
A. Is Asset Securitization a Judgment Proofing Technique?
Schwarcz is correct that Exxon could have securitized its assets without

judgment proofing itself by paying the dividend,4 that Exxon could have sold
its assets without securitizing them and still judgment-proofed itself by paying the dividend,5 and that Exxon could have judgment proofed itself even
without selling or securitizing its assets, by distributing the assets to share-

holders as a dividend.6 Schwarcz is wrong, however, in concluding that
these possibilities refute my contention that asset securitization is a dangerous new threat to liability. To see the fallacy, consider by analogy the invention of a new tool that makes burglary easier. Neither the fact that the
new tool has uses other than burglary nor the fact that burglaries could be
accomplished without it would prove that the new tool was not a dangerous
new threat to the security of homes. Asset securitization is under attack because it appears to be the most efficient, effective judgment proofing tool
currently available.

Schwarcz's principal goal in this section of the article seems to be to
distance asset securitization-the innovative business transaction he pioneered while in practice-from its common consequence-reduction in the
operating entity's (Fl's) ratio of assets to liability risk.7 Schwarcz attempts
to increase that distance by dropping the word "asset" from the phrase I

4. See Schwarcz, supra note 1, at 15 ("Only a subsequent disposition of that cash, unrelated to
the securitization, would cause judgment proofing.").

5. See id. at 13-14 ("F2 could finance the purchase of [Exxon's] assets through traditional
techniques, such as bank borrowing.").

6. See id. at 14 n.59 ("Fl also could judgment proof itself absent a sale-leaseback by transferring its assets as dividends to its shareholders.").
7. For examples of recent transactions that reduced firms' ratios of assets to liability risk, see
infra, note 21. Schwarcz responds by stating that "[i]n fact, the common consequence of a securitization is to leave [the ratio of assets to liability risk] unchanged." See Steven L. Schwarcz, Judgment Proofing: A Rejoinder, 52 STAN. L. REV. 77, 79 (1999). His only support for that assertion is

a citation to a hypothetical in his book on asset securitization. Id. at 79 n. 14. The hypothetical
proves my point, not his. Through asset securitization the firm in the hypothetical went from owning assets of 200 to owning assets of 1 10, without changing its operations and thus without changing its liability risk. Thus, his hypothetical is one in which the firmn reduced its ratio of assets to
liability risk through asset securitization.

This content downloaded from
128.227.201.83 on Fri, 08 Jul 2022 17:19:23 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms

Nov. 1999] LOPUCKIRESPONSE 57

used8 and treating the issuance of securities by F2 (the "securitization") as
the entire transaction in question.9 By his now strained definition, Exxon,
the party Schwarcz himself refers to elsewhere as the "originator" of the "securitization,"'1O is not even a party to it:
Thus, Fl [Exxon], the very company that is in danger of becoming judgmentproofed by securitization, would not technically be a party to the securitization

transaction. More substantively, securitization is merely a way of allowing F2

[the bankruptcy-remote vehicle] to finance the purchase of Fl's [Exxon's] assets, with F] receiving the sale proceeds. Judgment proofing only could result
from Fl's disposition of those sale proceeds for less than their value. That disposition, if it occurred, would be independent of the securitization transaction.1'1

Even if correct, Schwarcz's argument for the "legitimacy"12 of asset securiti-

zation in no way refutes my thesis. Liability will be just as dead whether it
dies from asset securitization or from asset securitization followed by a typical disposition of the proceeds.13

B. Does the Judgment Proofing Debtor Receive Equivalent Value in Return?

Schwarcz argues that if a company wishes to judgment proof itself, it
would have to transfer its assets.14 He then goes on to say that
It is possible to divide potential recipients of the transfer into three categories:

the company's creditors, the company's owners (its shareholders), and third
parties other than creditors and owners. A transfer of assets to creditors would
be the antithesis of judgment proofing.... A transfer of assets to unrelated third
parties should not cause judgment proofing because no rational company will

8. See Schwarcz, supra note 1, at 13 ("Securitization has been alleged to be the most dangerous threat to liability."). What I actually said was that "[aisset securitization may be the silver
bullet capable of killing liability." LoPucki, supra note 3, at 30 (emphasis added).

9. For example, Schwarcz notes that "on a formalistic level, only the entity [F2], and not
Exxon [F]], could sell that asset in a securitization transaction." Schwarcz, supra note 1, at 14.

10. See Steven L. Schwarcz, Rethinking a Corporation's Obligations to Creditors, 17 CARDOZO L. REv. 647, 682 (1996) (stating that "[i]n a securitization, a company (the 'originator') can
obtain low cost, capital market financing by transferring its accounts receivable or other rights to
payment ('receivables') to a newly formed special purpose corporation, trust, or other legally separate entity (the 'SPV').").

11. Schwarcz, supra note 1, at 13 (footnote omitted).

12. See id. at 14 ("The possibility that securitization or other financing techniques might be
misused should not undermine their overall legitimacy.") (footnote omitted).
13. See note 21 infra (giving examples showing that securitizers often distribute proceeds to
creditors and shareholders).

14. Schwarcz, supra note 1, at 16. In a footnote Schwarcz limits this statement to the judgment-proofing of already established businesses. With respect to a new business, parties can create
a judgment proof structure without a transfer of assets by Fl. See Lynn M. LoPucki, The Essential
Structure ofJudgment Proofing, 51 STAN. L. REv. 147, 156 (1998).
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give away its assets without demanding equiv

arm's length context, none of these transfers c

Schwarcz's conclusion that these transfers
wrong as to the creditors and misleading as

To understand how payments to creditor
sider an example in which Exxon has asset
$40 billion and liabilities to unsecured ban
Exxon sells its assets for their fair marke
proceeds to the banks. Exxon now has assets of nominal value and no liabilities. By leasing its assets back, it is able to continue to operate its business in the same manner as before the transaction. Prior to this transaction, a
tort creditor who won a judgment against Exxon in the amount of $10 billion
could reasonably have expected to recover eighty percent of that amount.16
After payment of the proceeds of the asset securitization to the banks, such a
tort creditor would have been able to achieve only a nominal recovery. The
investors who replaced the banks in Exxon's financial structure-the purchasers of securities in the asset securitization-would be the absolute own-

ers of all of the assets used in Exxon's business. That is judgment proofing.17

Schwarcz responds that although "it may be so" that "payment of voluntary creditors, such as bank lenders, could prejudice involuntary creditors,
such as tort creditors," that "is irrelevant."18 He explains that "[p]referential
payment by an insolvent company always could prejudice remaining creditors, which is precisely why bankruptcy law avoids such preferential payments."19 Schwarcz misses the point of my example. Exxon made the payments in my example while solvent, and long before the prebankruptcy preference period. They are not avoidable as preferences.20 Nor, I am confident,
could Professor Schwarcz propose a law that made them avoidable without
casting doubt on most of the asset securitization transactions described in
footnote 2 1.

15. Schwarcz, supra note 1, at 16.
16. That is, as an unsecured creditor, the tort creditor would have been entitled to a pro rata
share of Exxon's assets in the most likely legal proceeding, a chapter 11 reorganization.

17. Schwarcz misses this point by focusing on the debtor's equity rather than its assets. For
example, he views the transaction in which RCPI loaned Rockefeller Center $1.3 billion in secured
debt to buy Rockefeller Center as obviously not judgment proofing because the transaction "pre-

serv[ed] the net worth that RCP enjoyed prior to the loan ...." Schwarcz, supra note 1, at 17
(footnote omitted). Schwarcz ignores the fact that the transaction put $1.3 billion worth of liabilitygenerating assets in the hands of the debtor without measurably increasing the amount of assets

available to pay the liabilities generated. To put it another way, RCPI's security interest assured
that under no circumstances would the $1.3 billion the investors supplied be available to pay the
liabilities generated as a result of the economic activity that $1.3 billion in financing made possible.
18. See Schwarcz, supra note 7, at 79.
19. See id.

20. See 11 U.S.C. ? 547(b)(3)-(4) (1988).
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Schwarcz's assertion that an arm's length transfer of assets to an unre-

lated third party does not cause judgment proofing is true on its face, but
misleading in context. Firms that sell to third parties assets they continue to
use generally have a plan for the use of those proceeds. For most firms
whose asset securitization transactions have recently been reported in the
press, that plan was to pay creditors or shareholders.21 To the extent the proceeds were so applied, those transactions reduced the assets available to future creditors, thereby judgment proofing the originators.22

C. Do the Costs of Judgment Proofing Outweigh the Benefits?

To explain why he thinks it irrational for an owning entity (F2) to participate in a transaction that judgment proofs an operating entity (F1)

Schwarcz defines and uses two variables. He designates "the amount of
value that judgment proofing is expected to take from [judgment] creditors"
as A,23 and "the amount of compensation that F2 [the asset-owning entity]

would require" for participating in the transaction as K.24 Schwarcz concedes

21. See, e.g., Case Capital Announces Pricing of ABS Transaction, Bus. WIRE, Mar. 10, 1999
(announcing that proceeds of a $759.5 million asset-backed securitization would be used "to repay
outstanding debt and to fund [Case's] growing portfolio of receivables"); Cherokee Declares $5.50
Cash Distribution; Completes $48.0 Million Securitization; Changes Fiscal Year End, Bus. WIRE,
Dec. 23, 1997 (describing a transaction in which $48 million of proceeds from an asset securitization would be distributed to shareholders); Credit Acceptance Corp. Announces Completion of First
Securitization, Bus. WIRE, July 8, 1998 (noting that the proceeds of a $50 million securitization
"were used to reduce indebtedness under the company's line of credit and revolving credit facilities"); DCR Rates Illinois Power Company's $100 Million Issuance `BBB+', PR NEWSWIRE, Sept.
11, 1998 (announcing that Illinois Power proposed that proceeds of a $864 million securitization
would be "used to repay debt and repurchase common and preferred stock primarily proportional to
the existing capital structure"); Mazda to Securitize Finance Unit's Loan Claims, JIJI PRESS TiCKER
SERVICE, Feb. 22, 1999 (stating that Mazda Credit Corp. would use the proceeds of a 100 billion

yen securitization "to repay borrowings"); PSE&G Files Stipulation with the Board, PR
NEWSWIRE, Mar. 17, 1999 (announcing that the net proceeds of a $2.475 billion securitization
would be used "to refinance or retire utility debt and/or equity"). See also David T. Brown et al.,
Asset Sales By Financially Distressed Firms, 1 J. CoRp. FIN. 233, 239-40, 242 (1994) (describing a
sample of 62 asset sales by distressed firms and noting that the proceeds of 30 of those sales were
used to repay debt).

Whether Schwarcz disagrees with my assertion that most asset securitization is to pay credi-

tors and/or shareholders is unclear. In the context of non-arm's length judgment proofing,
Schwarcz states that "[i]t is simply unrealistic to assume that the primary purpose of raising capital
is to distribute it to shareholders." Schwarcz, supra note 1, at 16 n.70. He may mean to say only
that most capital is raised for purposes other than paying shareholders.

22. This does not mean that all asset securitizations tend to judgment-proof the debtor. A
debtor might retain the proceeds of a securitization in cash as a means of increasing the debtor's
liquidity or use them to purchase more assets similar to those it securitized. However, if the debtor
employed the proceeds to expand its liability-generating operations, the effect would be to increase
the total liability risk without necessarily increasing the debtor's assets. The debtor would have
lowered its ratio of assets to liability risk, which is soft judgment proofing.

23. Schwarcz, supra note 1, at 17.
24. Id. at 18.
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that "judgment proofing may occur" if K i
that K must exceed F2's judgment proofing costs or F2 would have no incentive to enter into the transaction. He then discusses four categories of
such costs: financing premiums, increased liability risks, reputation costs,
and agency costs.26 Schwarcz argues that the costs in each category are large
and concludes that in total they "may well exceed A."27 He then notes that
the operating entity (F]) will need to keep some portion of A to reward it for
the judgment proofing effort, which further reduces the amount of costs the
judgment proofing transaction can carry.28 Schwarcz then adds reference to
other costs that judgment proofing will impose on the operating entity, which
include tax on the sale of assets, loss of liquidity, increased risk of bankruptcy, high agency costs as a result of possible liquidation, and possible
civil and criminal liability for directors and shareholders as a result of judgment-proofing the company.29 Finally, Schwarcz adds that the owning company (F2) will be risk averse in deciding whether to engage in the transaction
because it would do so solely for gain rather than to avoid loss.30 He concludes that "[a]s an economic matter, therefore, arm's length judgment
proofing is a dubious strategy."31

The first thing to note about this argument is the absence of any attempt
to quantify A or any of the factors that supposedly combine to overwhelm it.

Schwarcz is arguing that simply because there are a lot of factors and they
seem, as he describes them, large, they must add up to more than A. Absent
quantification, however, there is no reason to suppose that Schwarcz's long
list of judgment proofing costs adds up to more than the single benefit he
notes.

The second thing to note about his argument is its failure to take into account the great variation among companies in their liability risks and judg-

ment proofing costs. Today, A is high for a tobacco company, a gun manufacturer, or an orthopedic surgeon. Reputational costs may loom large for
companies with famous trademarks that seek capital in public markets, but
may be minimal for no-name companies that finance internally and market
under the brand names of others.32 This error leads Schwarcz into the appar-

25. Id.

26. See id. at 21-24.
27. Id. at 24.

28. See id. at 24 ("It would be irrational for Fl to offer compensation to F2 that approaches A,
the value of Fl's assets. Delta is the most that Fl could lose absent judgment proofing.") (footnote

omitted).

29. See id. at 25.
30. See id. at 27-28.
31. Id. at 25.

32. See Lynn M. LoPucki, Virtual Judgment Proofing: A Rejoinder, 107 YALE L.J. 1413,

1434 (1998) (discussing an example of such a "virtual" company).
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ent paradox that judgment proofing i

though it clearly is occurring in some in

Schwarcz has omitted from his calcu
judgment proofing transactions. Firs
debtors-asset securitization, leasing,
systems, and others-provide sufficient economic benefits that businesses
frequently use them even when they intend no judgment proofing effect.
These benefits do not disappear simply because a particular user does intend
judgment proofing effects. The judgment proofer who uses any of these de-

vices gets both the economic benefits of the device and A. To put it another
way, in some cases A will be a bonus for use of a device that was already
cost effective based on its other advantages.34 In those cases, the marginal
cost of judgment proofing is zero.

The second benefit of judgment proofing Schwarcz omits is the freedom
of the judgment proof business to engage in high-tort-risk activity with impunity. Schwarcz argues that the gain from judgment proofing a firm is limited to the value of a firm's assets before the judgment proofing.35 It is not.
To illustrate, assume that before judgment proofing, a firm has assets of 200.
The firm considers a series of business opportunities sequentially. The average expected return from each opportunity is 100, but each also has a 50%
chance of generating, along with that return, a tort liability of 300. If the
non-judgment proof firm's capital falls below 200, to avoid operating in a
judgment proof condition the firm must replenish its capital (perhaps through

a contrbution from shareholders);36 if the firm's capital rises above 200 the

33. See id. at 1430-32 (describing judgment proofing in the tobacco industry). See also
Christopher Drew & Andy Newman, Taxi Owners Deftly Dodge Claims of Accident Victims, N.Y.
TIMES, May 24, 1998 (describing judgment proofing in the New York City taxicab industry).
Schwarcz claims that "the law's evolution has recently limited judgment proofing even in [the New
York taxicab] context," but fails to note that the evolution to which he refers occurred before the
New York Times expose of judgment proofing cited in this footnote. Schwarcz, supra note 7, at 83.
Similarly, Schwarcz makes much of RJR Nabisco's rejection of a blatant judgment proofing plan,
but fails to note that the plan adopted instead, spinning off RJR, is a subtler, more sophisticated
example of judgment proofing. When tobacco plaintiffs eventually sue to reach Nabisco's assets
they will be met with a variety of reliance arguments based on a complete separation between RJR
and Nabisco that occurred many years before.

34. See LoPucki, supra note 14, at 158-59 (describing REITs as an example of this in the real
estate market); LoPucki, supra note 32, at 1433-34 (offering the example of a hypothetical airline

achieving this end).

35. Schwarcz defines A as "the amount of value that judgment proofing takes from [potential
future involuntary] creditors." Schwarcz, supra note 1, at 29-30. He also claims that "A is limited
to the value of Fl's interest in the assets used in its business. That is because, absent judgment
proofing, Fl's creditors could claim only against those assets." Id. at 20.
36. Schwarcz apparently contemplates that the non-judgment proof firm would not replenish
its capital when the capital was depleted by losses. Absent this assumption, Schwarcz's assertion
holds, but only because the "non-judgment proof' firm becomes judgment proof and does not pay
all its tort liabilities in later rounds. Without the replenishment assumption, the comparison would
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firm distributes the excess to shareholder
firm's payoffs will be identical with rega
The firm will decline to pursue the oppor
each, it has only a 50% chance of a net gain

of a net loss of 200, resulting in an expecte
a loss of 50.37

If the same firm could become judgment
remain judgment proof by distributing an

dertaking the next opportunity, the firm
Because the firm gains 100 from each oppo
gain (300) will exceed the assets of the non
pursuit of the third opportunity. Ultimatel

ing are limited only by the number of opport

The error in Schwarcz's reasoning shoul

judgment proofing are not, as he supposes,
the debtor's finite assets. The gains from j
the externalization of liability. Those gains
nities the debtor has to profit by wrongfu
opportunities are virtually unlimited. To m
judgment proofing opens the door to "bus
to asset-heavy companies. When a judgment proof company and a nonjudgment proof company are direct competitors, the non-judgment proof
company may have to shed its assets to survive.

The third benefit Schwarcz omits from his calculation is that judgment
proofing eliminates the deadweight cost of risk management borne by nonjudgment proof firms. If the firm buys insurance, that cost includes the cost
of maintaining a risk management department, the cost of selecting and contracting for insurance, and the amount by which premiums paid exceed the
amount paid tort creditors by the insurer. To the extent the firm self-insures,

those costs are the administrative costs of assessing, defending, and paying
claims against the company.38

Schwarcz also overstates the costs of arm's length judgment proofing.
The overstatement is largely attributable to his assumption that when an otherwise viable firm owes debt in excess of its ability to pay, liquidation is

not measure the gain from judgment proofing, but only the gain from one type ofjudgment proofing
rather than another.

37. (.5 x 100) + (.5 x -200) = -50. A more intuitive way of describing the non-judgment
proof firm's reluctance is that a firm with greater assets will have a lower propensity to commit
torts. In this context, that means a lower propensity to pursue the opportunity.

38. See LoPucki, supra note 3, at 44 (quantifying the total costs of liability for the average
large company (which includes A) at about $5 million per year).
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likely to result.39 Such liquidations are possible, but they would occur only

when the bankruptcy system malfunctioned. The ordinary outcome would be
for the firm to discharge its tort debt in bankruptcy while continuing its operations. Empirical evidence shows this to have been universally the case for
the past twenty years with regard to large public company bankruptcies.40
Schwarcz concedes the point with regard to large public companies.41
He disputes it with regard to small companies, but the distinction is not important. Both large and small companies frequently liquidate in bankruptcy.42 Whether a company liquidates is not, however, a function of how
much debt it has. Rather, it depends on whether-ignoring the firm's debtthe firm's future earnings stream is worth more than the proceeds that would
result from its liquidation43 (such firms are referred to as "viable" or merely
in "financial" as opposed to "economic" distress).44

39. See Schwarcz, supra note 1, at 18 (asserting that "F2 would demand compensation in excess of ordinary market-rate lease rentals because Fl, being judgment proof, may go bankrupt during the lease term, creating a risk that the rentals will remain unpaid"); id. at 19 (asserting that "because Fl is judgment proof, it might go bankrupt during the lease term") (footnote omitted); id. at
21 (arguing that bankruptcy might prevent a judgment proof debtor from paying future rentals under a lease); id. at 25 ("Fl almost certainly would liquidate in bankruptcy, depriving managers of
their jobs.") (footnote omitted); id. at 31 ("And if Fl or F2 is forced to liquidate, its officers may
well be able to find jobs with F3."). That supposed liquidation drives many of the costs Schwarcz
attributes to judgment proofing.

40. The Bankruptcy Research Database lists two bankruptcy cases by or against large, publicly held companies in the period 1980-1998 resulting from patent infringement liability (Smith
International and Paragon Trade Brands), two resulting from environmental liability (The Jessup
Group and Gulf USA), eight resulting from mass tort (Hillsborough Holdings, Lone Star Industries,
National Gypsum, Manville, Eagle-Picher, UNR Industries, AH Robins, and Dow Coming) and one
resulting from an intentional tort (Texaco). None of these cases resulted in the liquidation of the
company. Search of Bankruptcy Research Database, Lynn M. LoPucki (Oct. 1999) (search for
records using query NameCommon and TortCause = "Mass tort" or "Other tort" or "Environmental" or
"Patent"). Of the 239 companies in that database for which the result is known, 30 (13%) were
liquidated. See id.

41. See Schwarcz, supra note 7, at 82 ("True, but large public companies are least likely to
attempt to judgment-proof themselves, whereas small companies usually liquidate in bankruptcy.")
(footnote omitted).

42. See Lynn M. LoPucki & William C. Whitford, Patterns in the Bankruptcy Reorganization
of Large, Publicly Held Companies, 78 CORNELL L. REv. 597, 605 (1993) (noting that "Nearly all
[large, public companies in Chapter 11] liquidate some assets and a few liquidate all assets.").
Schwarcz argues that intentional judgment proofing would be a defense to discharge. See id at 83.
But corporate debtors that propose to continue in business are statutorily entitled to discharge all

their debts despite their fraudulent prebankruptcy conduct. See 11 U.S.C. ? 1141(d) (1988) (permitting objections to discharge only against individual debtors).

43. That is, the bankruptcy process seeks first to maximize the value of the company, and
only after accomplishing that to distribute that value among those with entitlements.

44. See, e.g., Barry E. Adler, A Theory of Corporate Insolvency, 72 N.Y.U. L. REv. 343, 344
(1997) ("It is an axiom of finance theory that a firm's financial health-its ability to pay its debtsis not synonymous with the firm's economic health-its ability efficiently to provide goods or services. It is commonly observed, therefore, that a debt-laden firm can suffer financial distress while

maintaining economic viability."); Carlos J. Cuevas, The Myth of Fiduciary Duties in Corporate
Reorganization Cases, 73 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 385, 409-10 (1998) ("A firm is in economic dis-
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Deliberately judgment proofed firms are the type least likely to liquidate
in bankruptcy. Typically their distress will be the result of tort debt that exceeds their assets, that is, financial distress. Only by coincidence would it
include economic distress from noncompetitive products, weak markets,
poor management, or the like. That, not the size of the companies involved,
is the reason for the low rate of liquidation of companies owing primarily tort
claims.

Nor does the bankruptcy reorganization of an insolvent, yet viable, firm
necessarily threaten the firm's lessors. Viable firms ordinarily need the assets they lease to continue their business. As a condition of keeping those
assets, bankruptcy law requires that debtor firms pay their lessors in full, including past and future rents and damages to the lessor resulting from any
breach that has occurred.45 Debtors are free to reject leases and can be expected to do so when the rental rates are above the market. The parties can,
however, eliminate that risk by agreeing, at the time of leasing, to adjust the
rent payable to the market rent penodically.46 At the time of bankruptcy, the
transaction costs involved in switching to another lessor would prevent rejection. By these means, lessors can effectively contract to be made whole
when their viable lessees reorganize. It follows that lessors need bear no
substantial risk from bankruptcy so long as their debtors remain viable.
Lessors do bear a risk of loss in the bankruptcy of a judgment proof nonviable debtor. Such a debtor will be liquidated, and the lease may not be performed. But judgment proofing substantially increases neither the risk that a
debtor will be nonviable nor the anticipated amount of the lessor's loss when
nonviability occurs. To understand why, assume that F], a firm with revenues of 200, securitizes all of its assets by selling them to F2, a trust estab-

lished for the sole purpose of acquiring those assets, for 1000. F] distributes
the proceeds to shareholders. Because the post-transaction F] operates exactly the same business the pretransaction debtor would have, using exactly
the same assets,47 the post-transaction F] has no substantially greater risk of
economic distress than the pretransaction debtor would have had.48
should be liquidated immediately. On the other hand, a firm that is in financial distress has financial problems which are primarily related to its capital structure; enterprises that are experiencing
financial distress are viable companies and should be reorganized.") (footnote omitted).
45. See 11 U.S.C. ? 365(b) (1993 & Supp. 1999).

46. If the debtor considers its variable rent rate a problem, it may be able to swap with a third
party for a fixed rate.

47. See LoPucki, supra note 14, at 153-56 (discussing aspects of asset use in businesses divided into owning and operating entities).
48. In responding to their cash-flow problems, the managers may make mistakes that render
the firm nonviable. Sophisticated judgment proofers would, however, replenish their working
capital rather than alter their operations. New working capital would be available to them in most
cases-in or out of bankruptcy-for the simple reason that they are a viable firm. See Lynn M.
LoPucki, A General Theory of the Dynamics of the State Remedies/Bankruptcy System, 1982 WIs.
L. REv. 311, 325-27 (1982) (illustrating that a viable firm may continue to operate at a loss). Such
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Because the post-transaction F] has no cushion of assets with which to
pay its liabilities, the likelihood that excessive debt will force it into bank-

ruptcy is higher than the likelihood would have been in the absence of judgment proofing. But in such a debt-driven bankruptcy, a viable F] will reorganize and make its lessor, F2, whole. Those who invested in the owning
entity associated with a nonviable, judgment proof debtor fare no worse in
bankruptcy than those who invested in an otherwise identical nonviable, nonjudgment proof debtor. In or out of bankruptcy, both sets of investors have
access to all cash flows of the pretransaction debtor (200) and all assets of
the pretransaction debtor (1000).

To put it another way, F2's investors were not disadvantaged by removal
of the assets of F] in the judgment proofing process, because those assets
were removed to F2. In fact, F2 is in a better position after judgment proofing than it would have been had it lent its investment to F], because it need
not compete with other creditors of F] for those assets and in addition will
not be as vulnerable to the bankruptcy proceeding.49 Because the investors'
risk is actually reduced by the judgment proofing transaction, charging the
judgment proof debtor a financing premium would be irrational.50

Schwarcz also exaggerates the increased liability risks from judgment
proofing in two respects.51 First, he erroneously asserts that judgment
proofing will increase the total assets vulnerable to judgment creditors of F],
because creditors may be able to recover from assets of F2 that otherwise
would not have been available to them.52 But if F2 is part of a sophisticated
arm's length judgment proofing scheme, it will own no assets other than

those F] would have owned but for the scheme. Second, Schwarcz asserts
that the liability imposed on F] and F2 for use of a judgment proofing
scheme can exceed the liability that would have been imposed in the absence
of judgment proofing because the "creditors also might be able to recover
replenishments routinely occur with respect to single asset real estate entities, in and out of bank-

ruptcy.

49. As the owners of the assets, lessors have greater rights in bankruptcy than even secured
creditors. For example, lessors generally are entitled to payments while the case is pending. See
LYNN M. LOPucKI, STRATEGIES FOR CREDITORS IN BANKRUPTCY PROCEEDINGS 717-27 (3d ed.
1997) (describing strategies for obtaining "rent" payments during chapter 11 reorganization). Secured creditors generally are not. See id. at 523-26 (describing strategies for restricting payments to
secured creditors during chapter 11 reorganization).

50. Schwarcz himself has argued that asset securitization generally reduces the costs of financing in comparison with secured or unsecured lending. See Steven L. Schwarcz, The Universal
Language of Cross-Border Finance, 8 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 235, 236 ("Thus, companies that
otherwise cannot obtain financing now can do so; and companies that can obtain financing now
may be able to do so at lower cost.") (footnote omitted).
51. Schwarcz, supra note 1, at 21.

52. The passage is less than clear, stating that "[the future claims of Fl's creditors] may even
exceed A-which, recall, is limited to the value of Fl's interest in its assets even if the amount of
future involuntary claims is greater-because Fl's creditors could assert their entire claims against
F2." Id. at 22 (emphasis in original) (footnotes omitted).
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punitive and treble damages."53 However, Schwarcz cites not a single case

in which punitive or treble damages have ever been imposed for judgment
proofing. The cases he does cite demonstrate that courts do not award punitive or treble damages for even the clumsiest and most egregious cases of
judgment proofing.54 The most courts do about judgment proofing schemes
is to unravel them. What that means to a judgment proofer is that there is no
harm in trying.

I have previously acknowledged the existence of some reputational costs

to the operating entity (F]) in judgment proofing schemes.55 Schwarcz now
seeks to add reputational costs to the owning entity (F2):
[The potential reputational cost] is caused by the bad publicity arising out of

judgment proofing and includes the following risks: that F2's debt rating may

be lowered by rating agencies, impairing F2's ability to obtain capital market
financing; that consumers may refuse to buy F2's products for fear that F2 will
not stand behind its warranties (or provide future parts and services); that F2
may have difficulty obtaining trade credit; that F2 may impair its relationships

with governmental entities; and that F2 and its officers and directors may even
become subject to criminal liability, including under the Racketeer Influenced
and Corrupt Organizations Act ("RICO").56

In fact, the typical owning entity (F2) will suffer none of these reputational effects. That entity will not risk an existing reputation, it will be a new
corporation or trust set up for the sole purpose of holding title to the assets.
The entity will conduct no other business. Rating agencies would be concerned with the risk that the transaction might not withstand attack, but only

to the extent of the liability courts might impose. They would have no reason to downgrade further on the basis of "reputation." Reputation with consumers would not be a problem because F2 would sell no products. Trade
credit would not be a problem because F2 would seek none.57

The only governmental entity likely to be involved would be the Securities Exchange Commission. Schwarcz does not explain why the SEC would
be hostile to F2, a solvent, arm's length buyer of assets for their full market
value, or why it would seek to inflict a penalty on F2 that ultimately would
be borne by innocent public investors. Nor should the officers and directors
of F2 have anything to fear from the SEC, plaintiffs, or prosecutors.58 Their
53. Id. at 22 (footnote omitted).

54. See, e.g., Schmoll v. Acand, Inc., 703 F. Supp. 868 (D. Or. 1988) (thwarting an egregious
judgment proofing scheme by holding Raytech (F2) liable for asbestos claims against Raymark
(F]), but failing to impose punitive or treble damages).
55. See LoPucki, supra note 3, at 51-54.

56. Schwarcz, supra note 1, at 23 (footnotes omitted).

57. Schwarcz argues that "an assetless F2" is "unrealistic." Schwarcz, supra note 7, at 78
n. 10. But every asset securitization transaction begins with the creation of just such an asset-less
F2 to accept the transfer of assets.

58. The examples Schwarcz cites are not examples of civil or criminal liability for judgment
proofing; they are examples of civil or criminal liability for mismanagement that harmed the firm.

This content downloaded from
128.227.201.83 on Fri, 08 Jul 2022 17:19:23 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms

Nov. 1999] LOPUCKIRESPONSE 67

fiduciary duty was to their own inve
Moreover, the stigma of participatio
less than Schwarcz supposes, as eviden
tors in liability-prone businesses now
proofing strategies openly.59

Schwarcz's argument that F1 migh
on its judgment proofing transfer o
raises the possibility that the law mi
judgment proofing transactions as a
context of current law, Schwarcz mak
newly forming firms would acquire
them permanently, so no taxable tra
isting firms would only be at risk w
the assets exceeded the proposed sale
an earlier work that it might be poss
be a sale for debtor-creditor purpose
Fourth, even an existing firm with
could judgment proof without incur
rather than the steel mill to F2. Tha
and the new company, F2 would oper
In most cases, judgment proofing is not without cost. F2 must have
separate management, and F2 may wish to indemnify them and/or insure
them against personal liability. These costs are, however, dwarfed by the
potential benefits from judgment proofing. As I discussed in The Death of
Liability, the total cost of liability risk and management for a large company
is, on average, about $5 million annually.63 For some large companies, those
potential direct savings from judgment proofing would be much higher than
for others, making the former prime candidates for judgment proofing.

See Schwarcz, supra note 1, at 25 n.123 (citing John C. Coffee, Jr., Shareholders Versus Managers:
The Strain in the Corporate Web, 85 MICH. L. REv. 1, 18-19 & 18 n.46 (1986)).

59. See Constance L. Hays, Fighting RJR, Icahn Demands That It Spin Off Nabisco Stake,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 12, 1999, at Cl (describing debate between Steven F. Goldstone, CEO, and Carl
Icahn, shareholder, over how to best protect the assets of Nabisco from the "liability from lawsuits
over smoking").

60. See Schwarcz, supra note 1, at 13 ("Fl, however, would have an immediate and significant disincentive against engaging in this threshold transaction: It would be taxed on the sale income.") (footnote omitted).
61. See STEVEN L. SCHWARCZ, STRUCTURED FINANCE: A GUIDE TO THE PRINCIPLES OF
ASSET SECURITIZATION 46-47 (2d ed. 1993).
62. This strategy of no tax transfer is analogous to the strategy of no transfer by Fl that defeated the application of fraudulent transfer law. See LoPucki, supra note 3, at 28.
63. See id. at 44-45.
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II. NON-ARM'S LENGTH TRANSACTION JUDGMENT PROOFING

Schwarcz acknowledges that the costs of non-arm's length judgment
proofing, are considerably lower than the costs of arm's length judgment
proofing,64 and does not dispute that "computerization will make the logistics
of judgment proofing easier and cheaper."65 He considers the cost argument
"irrelevant," however, because "legal liabilities" are "the real deterrent to
judgment proofing."66

In support of his position he reviews eight legal doctrines that potentially
regulate non-arm's length judgment proofing-(l) fraudulent transfer, (2)
substantive consolidation, (3) corporate veil piercing, (4) corporate law restrictions on dividends, (5) director's fiduciary duties to creditors, (6) lender

liability, (7) prima facie tort, and (8) civil and criminal liability under
RICO67-and concludes that "[j]udgment proofing ... is regulated by laws
that not only restrict a company's ability to judgment-proof itself but also
may impose costs on the parties participating in the judgment proofing transaction."68 After mentioning the empirical evidence Professor James J. White
presented in opposition to the death of liability thesis,69 Schwarcz ultimately
concludes that "[e]xisting constraints on judgment proofing ... already appear adequate, and the law is likely to evolve additional restrictions as necessary."70

In fact, none of these eight doctrines constitutes a substantial threat to
sophisticated judgment proofing. As to the first, fraudulent transfer,
Schwarcz acknowledges that strategists can set up judgment proof structures
without the liability generating company txansferring anything,71 rendering
fraudulent transfer law irrelevant.72 Though Schwarcz argues vigorously for
his second and third theories, substantive consolidation and corporate veil
piercing, he has not challenged my assertions in The Death of Liability that
(1) only one misdeed-undercapitalization-is necessary to judgment proof
an entity, and (2) undercapitalization alone is generally considered an insuf64. See Schwarcz, supra note 1, at 29-31 (stating that financing premiums, federal taxation,
and the concern about criminal liability under RICO are less significant in non-arm's length judgment proofing).

65. Schwarcz, supra note 7, at 84.
66. Id.

67. See Schwarcz, supra note 1, at 32-48.
68. Id. at 47 (footnote omitted).
69. See id. at 11. Schwarcz is apparently unconvinced by my refutations of White's empirical
evidence, see LoPucki, supra note 32, at 1415-22, but cuts off further debate by failing to explain

his reasons.

70. Schwarcz, supra note 1, at 53.

71. See id. at 35 ("Fraudulent conveyance law does not, however, protect against the use of
structures in which Fl, the operating company, is undercapitalized at its creation. Because there is
no transfer of assets, fraudulent conveyance law does not apply.") (footnote omitted).
72. See LoPucki, supra note 3, at 28.
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Schwarcz acknowledges that his fou
stricts the payment of dividends tha
"may not restrict judgment proofing
The reason, Schwarcz explains, is that statutes in some states, including
Delaware, permit the payment of dividends up to the brink of insolvency.75
That accommodates even "hard" judgment proofing designed to deny any
recovery whatsoever to future involuntary creditors. Schwarcz also notes
that the judgment proofer can always make one of those statutes applicable
through its selection of a state of incorporation.76

The last four theories of liability Schwarcz puts forth as deterrents to
judgment proofing are imaginative extensions of existing law conceived by
him for his article. None has been suggested or endorsed by any court or
other commentator as a remedy for judgment proofing. Courts are unlikely
to ever employ them against sophisticated judgment proofing techniques because those techniques are based on principles so deeply ingrained in our
law, culture, and economic system that no court would see the techniques as
objectionable-let alone want to challenge them.77 Thinking hypothetically
and in the abstract, probably most courts would gladly extend Schwarcz's
eight theories to strike down "judgment proofing." But when they encounter
concrete examples of sophisticated judgment proofing, they recognize what
they themselves regard as the very engines of the American economy-asset

securitization, leasing, secured credit, and corporate limited liability. To
judgment proof requires no more than these devices accomplish in their ordinary use.

Corporate limited liability provides an excellent example. The Sixth
Circuit recently upheld a judgment proofing scheme in which a single business was divided among three corporations-one to hire truck drivers, a second to own trucks, and a third to own real property-against a National La-

73. See id. at 22-23.

74. See Schwarcz, supra note 1, at 39 n.200.
75. See id.
76. See id.

77. As to corporate limited liability, the Supreme Court recently stated that "[i]t is a general
principle of corporate law deeply 'ingrained in our economic and legal systems' that a parent corporation ... is not liable for the acts of its subsidiaries." United States v. Bestfoods, 524 U.S. 51, 61

(1998) (quoting William 0. Douglas & Carrol M. Shanks, Insulation from Liability Through Subsidiary Corporations, 39 YALE L.J. 193 (1929)).
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bor Relations Board back-pay order.78 Two ye
wrote that
The doctrine of limited liability is intended precisely to protect a parent corporation whose subsidiary goes broke. That is the whole purpose of the doctrine,
and those who have the right to decide such questions, that is, legislatures, be-

lieve that the doctrine, on the whole, is socially reasonable and useful. We
think that the doctrine would largely be destroyed if a parent corporation could
be held liable simply on the basis of errors in business judgment.79

Just last year, the Supreme Court held a parent company not liable under

CERCLA as an operator of a toxic waste facility.80 The court did so even
though the parent's employees served as president and chief executive officer of the subsidiary that operated the facility; the parent actively participated

in, and at times controlled, the policy-making decisions of the subsidiary;
and the parent actively participated in and exercised control over day-to-day
decision making at the subsidiary.81 That decision effectively gives assetowning parents the ability to direct both the policy and day-to-day decision
making of liability generating subsidiaries and reap the benefits of their operations, without incurring liability for the subsidiaries' wrongful acts.

These decisions are not aberrations. They represent a broad legal and
policy consensus in favor of non-arm's length judgment proofing (though not

by that name). In his review of 3800 judicial opinions in which parties
sought to pierce the corporate veil, Professor Robert Thompson found that
those parties succeeded in about 40% of reported cases.82 When a plaintiff
sought to pierce within a corporate group, the success rate was only 34%.83
When that plaintiff was a tort creditor, the success rate fell to 12%.84 That

low success rate masks an even lower attempt rate. Only 76 (2%) of the
3800 parties seeking to pierce were tort plaintiffs seeking to reach the assets
of a parent corporation, and only 9 (0.2%) were tort plaintiffs who succeeded

in that.85 Those low rates suggest the existence of a much larger number of

similarly situated tort plaintiffs who did not even try. Contrary to
Schwarcz's implication,86 the odds of piercing the corporate veil used in nonarm's length judgment proofing are truly minuscule. Considering the deference courts pay to corporate limited liability, the mystery is why any com78. NLRB v. Fullerton Transfer & Storage, Ltd., 910 F.2d 331 (6th Cir. 1990).
79. Radaszewski v. Telecom Corp., 981 F.2d 305, 311 (8th Cir. 1992).
80. See United States v. Bestfoods, 524 U.S. 51, 55 (1998).
81. See id. at 68-70.

82. See Robert B. Thompson, Piercing the Veil Within Corporate Groups: Corporate Shareholders as Mere Investors, 13 CONN. J. INT'L L. 379, 384, 387 (1999).
83. See id. at 386.
84. See id.
85. See id.

86. See Schwarcz, supra note 1, at 31 (stating that in non-arm's length judgment proofing, F3
may "become directly subject to claims by Fl's creditors, through the doctrine[] of piercing the

corporate veil").
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pany would retain the risk of tort lia
can so easily extemalize it.
III. CONCLUSION

Schwarcz correctly identifies the pivotal issue on which the future of
judgment proofing depends: Do the benefits of judgment proofing exceed
the costs? He misses some judgment proofing benefits and his arguments do
not support the level of costs he asserts exists. Ultimately, the answer to the
question he poses varies from firm to firm and changes over time. But the
fact that we have now focused on the issue of costs versus benefits demonstrates that this debate has crossed an important threshold. We no longer
suppose that any structural impediment to judgment proofing exists in law.
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